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INTER VIVOS TRUSTS-Potential Beneficiary's Right 
To Compel Trustee To Render a Formal 
Accounting and Disclose Information 
981 
In recent years the inter vivos or living trust1 has become a popu-
lar method of disposing of property2 and in the future its use is 
likely to be even more widespread.3 Consequently, it has become 
increasingly important that the law governing such dispositions be 
both unequivocal and just. Unfortunately, in at least one situation 
this is not the case: When a person, believing himself to be a po-
tential beneficiary of an inter vivos trust, seeks to compel the 
trustee to render a formal accounting4 or disclose information con-
cerning the extent of his interest, 5 he will find the law ambiguous 
and often inequitable.6 
The recent case of Davidson v. Blaustein7 is illustrative of the 
difficulties which may arise in such a situation. The plaintiffs in 
that action were minors who had reason to believe that they were 
contingent beneficiaries of four inter vivos trusts established by 
their grandparents and great-grandparents. Although at least one 
1. An inter vivos trust is one created during the life of the settlor and may take 
effect without judicial action. It is thus to be distinguished from a testamentary trust 
which is settled by will and has no legal effect until probated by a court. A testa-
mentary trust becomes a matter of public record along with the will which creates 
it. In addition, most states require the trustee of such a disposition to render inter-
mediate and final accounts to the court having jurisdiction over the decedent-settlor's 
estate. For an examination of the relevant statutes in each state, see BOGERT, TRUSTS 8: 
TRUSTEES §§ 965-68 (2d ed. 1962). On the other hand, in all but six states, see note 
22 infra, the trustee of an inter vivos trust is not required to file the instrument in 
court or render a formal accounting unless requested to do so by the holder of a 
present possessory interest or a contingent beneficiary alleging mismanagement of 
the trust. See notes 13 8: 14 infra and accompanying text. 
2. See FARR, AN EsTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK 91 (3d ed. 1966). 
3. A recent bestselling book advocates the use of inter vivos trusts as a means 
of escaping the expenses of the probate procedure. DACEY, How To Avom PROBATE 
(1966). In addition, the American Bar Association's Committee on Continuing Educa-
tion of the Bar has recently produced and sponsored a movie "starring" Professor 
A. James Casner entitled The Revocable Trust-An Essential Tool for the Practicing 
Lawyer. Most of the ideas contained therein may be found in Casner, &tate Planning 
-Avoidance of Probate, 60 CoLuM. L. REv. 108 (1960). 
4. In the rendition of formal accounts (also known as "affirmative relief by ac-
counting'), the trustee must justify each_ transaction in which trust funds were used 
and produce all relevant records, vouchers, and receipts. See REsTATEMENT, TRUSTS 
(SECOND) § 172 (1959). 
5. In the disclosure of information (al50 known as "discovery'), the trustee must 
make available the trust instrument and the records of his administration. See 
REsTATEMENT, TRUSTS (SECOND) § 173 (1959). 
6. One commentator has denied the existence of any law on the subject: 
If the law is uncertain and variegated in the individual states of the United 
States with relation to accounting of fiduciaries serving under testamentary in-
~truments i~ may }:>e said to be practically nonexistent with relation to account-
ings under mter vivos trusts. 
FARR, op. cit, supra note 2, at 217. 
7. 247 F. Supp. 225 (D. Md, 1965) [hereinafter referred to as principal case]. 
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of these trusts was created before 1938,8 the trustee never accounted 
to any of the beneficiaries and, while admitting that plaintiffs were 
contingent remaindermen,9 refused their request that they be pro-
vided with information concerning the scope, assets, and duration 
of the trusts. Plaintiffs brought suit in the Federal District Court 
of Maryland10 to compel the trustee (I) to render a formal account-
ing of his administration and (2) to disclose information as to the 
existence and terms of the trusts. On defendant's motion, the court 
dismissed both claims. It ruled that a person wishing to compel a 
formal accounting must allege either a present possessory interest or 
misconduct on the part of the trustee. Plaintiffs' failure to plead 
either of these rendered their suit for a formal accounting patently 
deficient, despite the fact that plaintiffs were unable to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted only because they had no 
knowledge of the precise terms of the trust instrument.11 As to plain-
tiffs' claim for disclosure of information, the court ruled that it did 
not provide an "amount in controversy" that would satisfy federal 
jurisdictional standards.12 Thus, plaintiffs failed to obtain any in-
formation concerning trusts of which they were admittedly benefi-
ciaries solely because they were unable to allege the very facts which 
it was the purpose of their suit to discover. As a result, they remained 
uninformed as to the existence of any conditions precedent to the 
vesting of their interests and therefore incapable of intelligently 
making their own estate plans. Of equal, if not greater, importance, 
is the fact that they were deprived of information without which 
they could not effectively protect the corpus of the trusts from mis-
management or unlawful conversion by the trustee. 
8. Principal case at 226, 
9. Defendant's motion to dismiss, p. 8. 
10. There was diversity of citizenship, plaintiffs being citizens of Texas and de-
fendant residing in Maryland, Principal case at 226, 
11. FED, R. C1v, P. 12(b)(6). 
12. Federal district courts have no jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases un-
less the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) 
(1964). The court noted that plaintiffs had not alleged that the information they 
sought had any present monetary value to them. Principal case at 228. Had plaintiffs 
stated a valid cause of action for a formal accounting, however, it is clear that their 
claim for disclosure of information could also have been heard under the doctrine 
of pendant jurisdiction: "If the court has jurisdiction of the principal action, it also 
has cognizance of any ancillary proceeding therein, regardless of the citizenship of 
the parties, the amount in controversy, or any other factor that would ordinarily de• 
termine jurisdiction." 1 .BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 23 
(Wright ed. 1960) (Emphasis added); accord, 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 0.90(3) 
(2d ed. 1964). However, if the claim supporting jurisdiction is so insubstantial as to 
fail to survive a motion to dismiss, the pendant claim will usually not be heard. Bell 
v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813, 819·20 (S.D. Cal. 1947). But see Massachusetts Universalist 
Convention v. Hildreth & Rogers Co., 183 F.2d 497, 501 (1st Cir. 1950) (declaring that 
a district court should have discretion to hear the non-federal claim if this will serve 
the interests of judicial economy); Note, Discretionary Federal Jurisdiction Over the 
Pendant Cause, 46 ILL. L. REv. 646 (1951). See generally WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 19 
(1963). 
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Although the result in Davidson is unfortunate, the federal dis-
trict court appears to have interpreted Maryland law correctly. In 
virtually all states, one who is presently entitled to payment of 
either income or corpus under a trust instrument may compel the 
trustee to render an account.13 It is also generally accepted that a 
contingent beneficiary may succeed in such an action when he 
alleges a ·wrongful dissipation of trust assets.14 However, no Mary-
land court has permitted a potential beneficiary to compel either 
a formal accounting or a disclosure of information without alleging 
that the trustee has been guilty of misconduct.15 Moreover, it ap-
pears that, absent legislation to the contrary, 16 the courts of every 
other state have taken a similar position.17 
Despite this seeming unanimity of judicial opinion, the leading 
commentators on the law of trusts have rejected the existing rule. 
Both Professors Bogert and Scott have stated that a potential bene-
ficiary has a right to force the trustee to render a formal accounting 
and to disclose information at reasonable times.18 The Restatement 
13. See 13oGERT, op. cit. supra note 1, § 970. Apparently this right has rarely been 
contested in Maryland and thus there are few cases which expressly so hold. However, 
Ehlen v. Ehlen, 63 Md. 267 (1885), does appear to stand for this proposition. More-
over, the negative implication of the cases cited in note 14 infra is clearly that if the 
persons suing in those instances had been present, rather than merely contingent, 
beneficiaries, no allegation of misconduct on the part of the trustee would have been 
required. It is worthy of note that Ehlen as well as almost all the authorities cited 
in note 14 involve testamentary trusts. As was suggested in note 6 supra, there is 
very little case authority dealing with actions for either formal accountings or dis-
closure of information with respect to inter vivos trusts. However, no court has made 
a distinction on this basis. 
14. E.g., .Badbam v. Johnston, 239 Ala. 48, 193 So. 420 (1940); Kollock v. Webb, 
113 Ga. 762, 39 S.E. 339 (1901); 13urrows v. Palmer, 5 Ill. 2d 434, 125 N.E.2d 484 
(1955); 131ackett v. Ziegler, 147 Iowa 167, 125 N.W. 874 (1910); In re Clarke's Will, 198 
Md. 266, 81 A.2d 640 (1951); Roberts v. Michigan Trust Co., 273 Mich. 91, 262 N.W. 
744 (1935); Northwestern Nat'l 13ank &: Trust Co. v. Pirich, 215 Minn. 313, 9 N.W.2d 
773 (1943); Canada v. Daniel, 175 Mo. App. 55, 157 S.W. 1032 (1913); Presbyterian 
Church v. Plainfield Trust Co., 139 N.J. Eq. 501, 52 A.2d 400 (Ch. 1947); In re Lowerre, 
104 Misc. 570, 172 N.Y. Supp. 171 (Surr. Ct. 1918); Spence v. Commonwealth Trust 
Co., 79 Pa. D. &: C. 307 (C.P. 1951); White v. White, 25 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. Comm'n 
App. 1930). 
15. E.g., Harlan v. Gleason, 180 Md. 24, 28-29, 22 A.2d 579, 581-82 (1941) (where 
there is no allegation of mismanagement and the time for distribution of corpus to 
beneficiaries is not at hand, an action for a formal accounting is demurrable). 
16. See notes 21-24 infra. 
17. See notes 13 &: 14 supra. 
18. Regarding actions for formal accountings: "In order to succeed in such a suit 
for accounting, it is not necessary that the beneficiary allege that there is any sum 
immediately due him under the trust, or that the trustee is in default." 130GERT, op. cit. 
supra note I, § 963. "The fact that a beneficiary has only a future interest and that 
his interest is contingent does not preclude him from compelling the trustee to 
account." ScotT, TRUSTS§ 172 (1956). 
Regarding actions for disclosure of information: "[I]he cestui is entitled to demand 
of the trustee all information about the trust and its execution for which he has any 
reasonable use," 130GERT, op. cit. supra § 961. 
The trustee is '!lnder a duty to the beneficiaries to give them upon their request 
at reasonable times complete and accurate information as to the administration 
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of Trusts has also espoused this view.19 All three have declared that 
the trustee has a duty to honor the beneficiary's request for infor-
mation concerning his interest in the trust and the manner in 
which it is being managed. A refusal to comply with the request 
is a breach of his duty and thus there is no need for the beneficiary 
to allege any additional misconduct in a suit to compel compliance.20 
A minority of the states have, by statute, also rejected the exist-
ing rule. In six states, the potential beneficiary is simply given an 
express right to compel a formal accounting or disclosure of infor-
mation by the trustee. 21 Legislation in another six states requires 
the trustee to render accounts in court periodically.22 Under such 
provisions, the trust instrument and accounts as rendered become 
matters of public record and thus no beneficiary can claim to be 
uninformed. In three additional states, statutes impose a similar 
requirement but their scope is expressly limited to court-appointed 
trustees.23 Finally, three states, of which Maryland is one, have 
statutes which permit the courts to take jurisdiction over inter 
vivas trusts at the request of "any interested party."24 Under these 
of the trust •••• [A] beneficiary who has a future interest ••• is entitled to such 
information whether his interest is vested or contingent. 
ScoIT, TRUSTS § 173 (1956). 
It is significant that in this area neither .Bogert and Scott nor the Restatement, 
see note 19 infra, make any distinction between the rules applicable to inter vivos 
and those applicable to testamentary trusts. As has been suggested, such uniform 
treatment is also characteristic of court decisions, see note 13 supra. 
19. Regarding actions for formal accountings: 
The trustee may be compelled to account not only by a beneficiary presently en-
titled to the payment of income or principal, but also by a beneficiary who will 
be or may be entitled to receive income or principal in the future. 
REsTATEMENT, TRUSTS (SECOND) § 172, comment c (1959). 
Regarding actions for disclosure of information: 
The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to give him upon his request at 
reasonable times complete and accurate information as to the nature and amount 
of the trust property, and to permit him • • • to inspect the subject matter of 
the trust and the accounts and vouchers and other documents relating to the 
trust. 
Id.§ 173. 
20. Although only Bogert expressly adopts the last part of this rationale, it appears 
to be the underlying premise of the broad rules set forth in Scott and the Restate-
ment. 
21. IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-703 (Supp. 1966); LA. REv. STAT. tit. 9, § 2089 (1964) 
(disclosure of information only); WASH. REv. ConE § 30.30.040 (1957); W. VA. CODE 
§ 44-4-10 (1966); WIS. STAT. § 231.36 (Supp. 1967); N.J. Sul'ER. CT. R. 4:105-4 (1965). 
22. The UNIFORM TRUSTEES' ACCOUNTING ACT §§ 12, 13 (1936), imposes such a re-
quirement. However, these sections are only in force in Kansas, KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 59-1606 (1964), Nevada, NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 165.130, 140 (1956), and New Mexico, 
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-2-12, -13 (1953). Other states have independently enacted similar 
provisions: IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.700 (1964); KY. REv. STAT § 25.175 (1962); w. VA. 
CODE § 44-4-1 (1966). 
23. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4051-52 (1964); MINN. STAT. § 501.34 (1947); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 67-572. (1962). 
24. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-04-02 (1960); PA. STAT. tit. 20, § 2833; tit. 17, § 284 
(Orphan's Court jurisdiction); tit. 20, § 2741 (Common Pleas Court jurisdiction) (1964); 
Mn. RuLES V71, V74 (1963). 
March 1967] Notes 985 
statutes, once jurisdiction is acquired, the court has discretion to 
order the trustee either to render a formal accounting or to disclose 
all relevant information.25 
In the remaining thirty-two states, the potential beneficiary is 
foreclosed from any relief if he is unable to allege that the trust 
has been mismanaged. Under such conditions, the temptation to 
plead falsely is considerable, especially since the more modem pro-
cedural rules do not provide effective sanctions against tactics of 
this kind.26 But, although such false allegations would carry the 
plaintiff past a motion to dismiss or a demurrer, the defendant could 
probably avoid the plaintiff's attempt to acquire desired information 
through the use of discovery procedures and plaintiff would thus fall 
victim to defendant's motion for summary judgment.21 Therefore, if 
the potential beneficiary is to be afforded relief in the majority of 
states, a change in the substantive law is necessary. 
Three major considerations favor such a change. First, the po-
tential beneficiary may fail to fulfill a condition precedent to the 
vesting of his interest merely because he is unaware of its existence. 
This might occur, for example, where the vesting of his remainder 
was contingent upon his marrying, entering the clergy, or graduat-
ing from college. Second, the potential beneficiary and his relatives 
may have difficulty in intelligently making their own estate plans. 
For instance, assume that the father of the beneficiary is considering 
various alternative means of distributing his estate. In determining 
the amount he must provide for his child's maintenance and educa-
tion, he will necessarily want to know both the extent of his child's 
potential interest and the conditions precedent to its vesting. Third, 
even a contingent beneficiary may be concerned with preventing 
25. According to the principal case, however, such relief is not available in a fed-
eral court, which has no power to assume "jurisdiction" over a trust in the sense 
that the term is used in these statutes. Principal case at 229. 
26. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, the only sanction 
which can be imposed for false pleading is provided in rule 11. This provision warns 
the attorney who knowingly signs a false pleading that he may be subjected to dis· 
ciplinary action. However, no penalty is imposed on the party and lawyers have 
been punished in only the most extreme cases. la BARRON &: HoLTZOFF, op. cit. supra 
note 12, § 332.1. 
27. Under the Federal Rules the events occurring after such a pleading would 
probably take the following course: Defendant would answer, FED. R. C1v. P. S(b), 
generally denying that plaintiff had any present interest in the trust property or that 
there had been any mismanagement on his part, and would then move for summary 
judgment, FED. R. CIV. P. 56. Meanwhile plaintiff would attempt to take defendant's 
oral deposition, hoping to obtain thereby the information which the trustee had pre-
viously refused to disclose, FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a). However, defendant would no doubt 
seek a protective order, FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b), on the grounds that plaintiff was trying 
to obtain on discovery the very information for which he had brought suit. Since 
this would clearly be a fair appraisal of the situation, it is quite likely that the judge 
would issue the order defendant sought. Once this occurred, plaintiff would be doomed 
to failure. The falsity of his pleading would be demonstrated at the summary judg-
ment hearing and a decree would be entered against him. 
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the mismanagement or unlawful conversion of the trust corpus in 
which he may someday have a present possessory interest. In most 
cases, the holders of the possessory rights would, by protecting their 
own interest, protect the interests of the contingent beneficiaries. 
However, if these persons are closely related to the trustee, they 
may prefer to refrain from bringing suit against him.28 Moreover, 
there is always the possibility of disinterest on the part of the holders 
of present interests or of collusion between them and the trustee. 
On the other hand, there are significant countervailing consid-
erations which favor the present policy of non-disclosure. First, if 
the law permits an accounting action to be brought by anyone who 
claims on information and belief to be a potential beneficiary, the 
specter of the "nuisance suit" arises. Certainly the trustee ought not 
to be forced to undertake the time-consuming task of rendering ac-
counts to any stranger who may be curious about the exact financial 
condition of his friend, business associate, or even prospective spouse; 
indeed, perhaps even the terms of the trust instrument should not 
be made available to such a person. However, as a practical matter, 
the threat of a flood of "nuisance suits" is not very grave. In most 
cases, the expense entailed in initiating a legal action will serve as an 
adequate deterrent to the more frivolous claims. In the rare situation 
in which the expense might appear to be justifiable (as, for example, 
in the marriage hypothetical), the public nature of such a suit will 
almost always operate as an additional deterrent. Second, where the 
settlor is still alive, it may be in his interest to maintain the secrecy of 
the terms of his disposition. A desire for such secrecy would appear to 
be particularly appropriate if the trust is revocable, for forced dis-
closures may subject the settlor to constant harassment by relatives 
and close friends who, for one reason or another, were not among 
the objects of his bounty. Third, the trust instrument itself may 
expressly provide that the terms of the trust remain undisclosed. 
The statutes that require the trustee to render formal accounts and 
disclose relevant information are divided as to the extent to which 
such a clause should be given effect.29 Where a testamentary trust 
28. In this regard, it is noteworthy that in the principal case the trustee was the 
son of two of the settlors and the grandson of the other two. Moreover, he was plain-
tiffs' grand-uncle. From these facts, it would appear likely that the life beneficiaries 
were also closely related to the trustee and this may explain why he had not been 
compelled to account for almost thirty years. Principal case at 226. 
29. IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-7ll (Supp. 1966) (settlor may waive statutory provisions 
relating to annual accountings to adult income beneficiaries but, by negative implica-
tion, he may not eliminate the right of "any beneficiary" to compel an accounting); 
WASH. R.Ev. CoDE § 30.30.20 (1957) (settlor may waive obligation of trustee to account 
annually but, by negative implication, he may not eliminate the right of "any bene-
ficiary" to compel an accounting); IowA CODE ANN. § 633.700 (1964) (settlor may waive 
obligation of trustee to re~der. a~n~al. accounts); MD. RULES V71(c)(3) (1963) (settlor 
may bar court from assuming JUnsd1ction over the trust by appropriate language in 
the instrument); UNIFORM TRUSTEES' ACCOUNTING ACT § 15 (1936) (settlor may relieve 
trustee of his duties under the Act by appropriate language in the instrument). 
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is involved, the vast majority of courts refuse to enforce such a 
clause.80 Nevertheless, since an inter vivas trust is not generally a 
matter of public record, it would seem that here the intention of 
the settlor should be effectuated.81 
Strong arguments can thus be made for refusing to compel dis-
closure in certain situations. However, there is no justification for 
categorically denying a potential beneficiary the right to compel 
both a formal accounting and the disclosure of information simply 
because he is unable to allege mismanagement on the part of the 
trustee. A new rule of law is definitely required and the proper 
formulation of such a rule can probably best be accomplished by 
legislative action. Ideally, such legislation should provide that "any 
interested party" can compel the rendition of formal accounts and 
disclosure of information at reasonable times subject to the follow-
ing qualifications: The equity court must have discretion to deny 
relief (I) where the settlor is alive and has expressed a desire that 
the terms of the trust remain secret; (2) where the trust instrument 
clearly manifests a similar intention; and (3) where justice and 
fairness so require. Moreover, the court should be permitted to 
order the disclosure of relevant information but deny a request for 
a formal accounting in appropriate circumstances.32 Under a statute 
of this nature, unfortunate results like the one in Davidson could 
be avoided. 
!10. E.g., Wood v. Honeyman, 178 Ore. 484, 169 P.2d 1!11 (1946). For a discussion 
of other relevant cases see Annot., 171 A.L.R. 6!11 (1947). 
!JI. This was the approach adopted in Application of Cent. Hanover Bank 8: Tmst 
Co., 176 Misc. 195, 26 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct.), afj'd mem. sub nom. Central Hanover 
Bank 8: Trust Co. v. Momand, 26!1 App. Div. 801, !12 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1941), afj'd mem. 
288 N.Y. 608, 42 N.E.2d 610 (1942). In this case, a woman created an inter vivos trust 
for herself for life and then for her issue. She provided that the trustee should render 
accounts to her semi-annually but that the remaindermen should not be permitted to 
compel an accounting during her life. The clause was enforced, the court mling that 
it was not against public policy. Although there was a statute invalidating exculpatory 
conditions, it was deemed applicable only to testamentary trusts. 
!J2, For example, if the beneficiary's interest is minimal, it might seem inequitable 
to make the trustee render a formal accounting of a multi-million dollar tmst. 
